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Abstract—  This  paper  assesses  the  economic  value  of 
changes  in  the  attributes  of  farmers’  irrigation  water 
property  rights  in  Tunisia.  Changes  on  attributes 
generated by the transfer process of the property rights 
from the collective to the individual level in addition to 
changes  in  “constitutional”  attributes  were  integrated 
into three scenarios. The valuation was conducted using 
the Contingent Valuation Method through the elicitation 
of individuals’ willingness to pay. Results show positive 
willingness  to  pay  values  for  all  scenarios.    However, 
farmers of the studied region are shown willing to pay 
more  for  changes  in  the  constitutional  attributes. 
Furthermore their willingness to pay appears to be most 
affected  by  their  perceptions  concerning  the 
organization  and  the  functioning  of  the  water  users’ 
association  to  which  they  belong  and  by  their 
productivity.   
Keywords—  Property  rights,  irrigation  water, 
Contingent Valuation.  
  I. INTRODUCTION  
Many  peoples  use  the  concept  of  property  rights 
(PR) in a narrow sense and equate it to the ownership 
of  a  resource  with  the  ability  to  completely  and 
exclusively control it. Property rights can however be 
better understood as overlapping “bundles” of rights 
[1]. These bundles of rights can be broadly defined as 
use  rights  of  access  and  withdrawal,  control  or 
decision-making  rights  to  manage  the  resource, 
exclude others from it, and to alienate, or transfer the 
resource  to  others  (see  [2]).  This  later  definition 
provides  an  important  set  of  descriptive  criteria  of 
property rights on which we’ll focus later in our study. 
Property rights of a specific resource can at the other 
hand  also  be  less  complete  than  described  in  these 
definitions. For example, owners can derive only some 
value from an asset, exclude only some people from 
using it, or transfer only certain uses for a specified 
time period. Often, irrigation water property rights are 
of this type of incomplete property rights  
A very consistent approach for classifying property 
right regimes consists of restricting the nature of the 
decision-making  entity  holding  the  rights  to  use  a 
particular  resource  [3].  Thus,  private  property 
corresponds to a single decision-making entity such as 
an individual person or firm; common property to a 
finite  collective  entity  such  as  a  cooperative  group; 
state property to a government entity; and open access 
to  the  absence  of  any  entity  with  decision-making 
power over a resource. In this framework, it is possible 
to encounter situations where multiple types of parties 
simultaneously  hold  decision-making  power  over  a 
resource. Ostrom (1990) [4] defines this property right 
hierarchy as a system of nested institutions.   
Combining the definition of property right attributes 
(criteria)  and  the  nested  institutions  aspect;  we  can 
remark  that  different  property  rights,  with  different 
characterizations,  can  be  transferred  from  one 
institutional level to another in periods. The objective 
of the current study is to focus on the specific transfer 
of rights from the collective to the individual level and 
to analyze the efficiency of this transfer operation as 
well  as  the  efficiency  regarding  some  specific 
constitutional criteria
1 of the individual property rights 
obtained.  Explicitly,  we  classify  property  right 
attributes  that  will  be  studied  into  two  groups;  (i) 
attributes related to the transfer operation or how well 
Water  Users  Associations  (WUA)  transfer  rights  to 
farmers which influences the stability of the right, and 
(ii) attributes specified by constitutional laws such as 
quantification of the right  (in the form of quotas) and 
the transferability of the right.  
                                                 
1.  By  constitutional  criteria  we  mean  criteria  that  are 
precised  by  constitutional  laws  and  mentioned  in  the 
Water law.    2 
In  fact,  many  studies  have  tried  to  assess  the 
relationship between the property right system and the 
ultimate  use  of  a  particular  resource  quantitatively. 
However, in cases where property right markets are 
absent,  no  information  is  available  neither  on  the 
economic value of specific rights nor on the marginal 
return  of  them.  It  is  however  known  that  consumer 
preferences’ for environmental and natural resources 
can  be  indirectly  estimated  through  non-market 
methods  (by  the  creation  of  a  hypothetical  market). 
These  methods  can  be  used  also  to  elucidate  the 
outcome  of  policy  reforms  and  changes  in  current 
situations.  Contingent  Valuation  Methods  (CVM) 
using the concept of willingness to pay (WTP) and/or 
willingness to accept (WTA) measures are among the 
most used methods.  
The  method  applied  in  this  study  consists  of 
eliciting the economic value among Tunisian irrigators 
using CVM in order to investigate the potential benefit 
of a hypothetical change in the property right system. 
Thus, WTP questions are used to value the specific 
outcome of policy scenarios intended to improve the 
individual irrigation water property right regarding the 
three attributes (criteria) mentioned before. The three 
policy scenarios chosen were (i) improvement of the 
stability of the right (reflecting the efficiency of the 
transfer  operation  from  WUA  to  farmers),  (ii) 
introduction of quantification (quotas) of the right, and 
(iii) adding transferability to the second scenario. The 
main  assumption  is  that  an  institutional  change 
concerning the property right attributes corresponds to 
an increase in the utility of the consumer as well as in 
society’s welfare. The evaluation criterion consists of 
comparing the estimated economic value of water in 
each  scenario  with  the  price  currently  charged  to 
irrigators.  Any  positive  deviation  is  considered  as 
economic rent, which is wasted.  
The paper is divided into four further sections. The 
first one gives an overview of the literature regarding 
the  relationship  between  property  right  systems  and 
efficient  resources  use.  The  second  section  presents 
the  CVM  used.  The  third  section  describes  the 
empirical application and the last section will present 
some  statistical,  economic,  and  institutional 
interpretations of the results obtained.   
  II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Few studies have reviewed the relationship between 
legal rights and the economic allocation of goods ([5]; 
[6]; [7]; [8]). Nevertheless, it is interesting to explain 
how different kinds and property right system affect 
individual  behavior  and  the  functioning  and  the 
efficiency of the economic system. Property rights can 
be  defined  as  “the  claims,  entitlements  and  related 
obligations  among  people  regarding  the  use  and 
disposition of a scarce resource” [9]. In general, the 
importance  and  the  enforcement  of  property  rights 
increase  with  respect  to  the  scarcity  of  a  given 
resource.  As  a  resource  becomes  scarcer  and 
competition  increases,  property  rights  can  clarify 
expectations  and  thereby  reduce  conflict  and 
interaction between users over the resource. Demsetz 
(1967)  [10]  mentions  that  a  primary  function  of 
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve 
a  greater  internalization  of  externalities.  A  situation 
where incentives are absent or not well defined, can be 
translated in a situation of incertitude, which affects 
the decision making of the property right holder.  
For natural resources, there are multiple levels of 
property rights, starting with broad powers of state or 
national (regional) government to control the use of 
the  resource,  and  ending  with  powers  of  individual 
users  to  control  it.  When  devolution  programs  do 
transfer of rights over resources to a user group or a 
local  government,  that  institution  becomes  the 
gatekeeper  determining  individuals’  rights  over  the 
resource  [1].  For  the  case  of  irrigation  water,  after 
failing  to  effectively  manage  irrigation  systems 
centrally,  many  governments  are  now  undertaking 
decentralization  and  devolution  programs  to  transfer 
responsibility of the management to local governments 
and  users’  groups.  Taking  into  account  that  these 
groups, generally known as water users’ associations, 
become  the  gatekeeper  determining  individuals’ 
irrigation  property  rights,  two  important  aspects 
related  to  property  rights  in  irrigation  management 
decentralization programs must then be mentioned and 
studied. The first one concerns the composition and 
the  characterization  of  the  property  right  bundles 
transferred: what is exactly transferred, both in terms 
of the water resource as in terms of other goods and 
services related to the resource? The second aspect is 
related to the operation of the transfer: how well are   3 
the property rights transferred from the collective to 
the individual level both in time and location? 
The response to these questions determines the final 
qualification  of  the  individuals’  property  right  on 
irrigation water and consequently its decision making, 
which  is  function  of  the  incentives  provided. 
Moreover each question is related to specific attributes 
of the property rights.  
Specific constitutional attributes can be considered 
as these that are fixed by constitutional laws and that 
are  different  according  to  countries  or  local 
governments. Specification of the transferability of the 
right,  the  duration,  and  the  frequency,  and 
quantification  of  the  right  can  be  considered  as 
examples of such attributes. Performance of the water 
delivery  system  in  terms  of  efficient  operation  and 
management  are  a  second  set  of  property  right 
attributes.  Various  performance  indicators  were 
proposed  in  literature  ([11];  [12];  [13];  [14]). 
Adequacy,  efficiency,  dependability  and  equity  are 
performance  objectives  considered  when  evaluating 
irrigation  water  delivery.  For  example,  the 
dependability criterion expresses the ability to provide 
water  at  the  right  time  and  in  the  right  place. 
Unreliable  water  distribution  is  quoted  as  a  major 
reason for low performance of irrigation systems [15]. 
A  similar  conclusion  can  be  drawn  for  the  other 
performance criteria. Low levels of these indexes may 
cause confusion and conflict among farmers leading to 
a low economic valorization of irrigation water.  
  III. METHODOLOGY 
The  economic  value  assessed  for  particular  less 
substitutable  goods  or  resources  including  various 
public  goods,  is  different  according  to  the  property 
right regime defined on it. It is therefore argued that 
the  WTA/WTP  ratio,  for  environmental  and  natural 
resources,  depends  on  the  individuals’  perception 
about the PR on these resources [16]. It also means 
that  people  are  willing  to  pay  more  when  their 
property  right  over  a  given  resource  is  clearer  ([5]; 
[17], [18]). Thus,  in  this study  we  suppose that  the 
opportunity of PR enhancement can be evaluated by 
non-market methods and assessed using the individual 
preferences.  Few  studies  have  applied  CV  for 
assessing PR improvement in the case of absence of 
markets for such rights. To our knowledge, the most 
important one is the one of Herrera et al. (2004) [18] 
which has undertaken an efficiency analysis of PR in 
Ecuador and finds that the WTP of farmers is positive 
when improvement of their rights is suggested. Stated 
preference methods were also applied by Chebil et al., 
(2007)  [19]  to  assess  the  efficiency  of  an  irrigation 
delivery system in Tunisia. They found that irrigators 
were willing to pay more than current water rates if 
the stability of their rights were to be improved.  
In this paper, we hypothesize that an institutional 
change  of  irrigation  water  property  right  attributes 
makes  farmers  more  willing  to  pay  for  the  water 
resource. We suppose hereby that in the Tunisian case, 
the current water property right bundle is inefficient 
and  that  an  improvement  in  characteristics  of  water 
usage right, can generate an additional economic rent. 
The  evaluation  criterion  consists  of  comparing  the 
resulting water economic value with the current price 
paid by irrigators. Any deviation can be considered as 
an  economic  rent,  which  is  exhausted.  The  single 
bounded  CVM,  based  on  dichotomous  questions,  is 
used  to  assess  farmers  WTP  for  scenario  of 
institutional change. A logit model is specified for this 
estimation.  
  A. Scenarios simulated 
In  our  case,  and  based  on  a  review  of  empirical 
studies of the irrigation water sector in Tunisia ([19]; 
[20]; [21]; [22]), we found that instability of irrigation 
water  supply  due  to  water  scarcity  and  technical 
problems  in  the  irrigation  network,  is  an  important 
factors that affects the perception and even behavior of 
farmers. In addition, farmers have no idea about the 
total quantity of water that is allocated to them at the 
beginning of the agricultural season. Furthermore, the 
usage property right is not transferable among farmers 
or  among  farmers  and  WUA.  Irrigators have  to  use 
their right otherwise they loose it. 
We  believe  that  insecurity  in  water  supply 
stimulates  farmers  to  overuse  water  when  getting 
access  to  it.  This  hypothesis  can  be  implicitly 
understood  as  an  expected  positive  farmers’ 
willingness  to  pay  for  a  stabilization  of  their  usage 
right over time. The same assumption can also be used 
to justify the choice for quantification of the right. In 
fact, a clearer and a fixed right can simply be synonym   4 
for  a  more  secure  right.  However,  concerning  the 
transferability,  it  is  well  known  that  this  attribute 
constitutes an incitation to farmers, which can expect 
potential benefits from selling or buying water among 
them. As proved by many studies around the world, 
water markets are seen by policy makers as important 
tools  to  improve  efficiency  in  water  resources 
allocation.  It  is  thus  interesting  to  have  information 
about farmers’ willingness to pay for such institutional 
change because this information should be integrated 
in  the  cost-benefit  calculation  of  institutional 
alternatives. 
According  to  this,  three  scenarios  are  defined, 
making  assumptions  concerning  the  performance  of 
WUA  in  water  delivery  services  and  concerning 
institutional  policy  changes.  Given  the  specific 
objectives of the study, attributes of the property right 
integrated  in  the  scenarios  can  be  divided  into  two 
types.  The  first  type  reflects  the  efficiency  of  the 
property  right  transfer  process  and  contains  the 
“stability  of  the  right”  attribute.  This  attribute  is 
generally  determined  by  the  WUA  performance
2. 
Thus, the first scenario supposes an improvement in 
the  stability  of  water  supply  leading  to  a  better 
stability of the right. The second type of property right 
attributes  contains,  a  constitutional  attribute  namely 
quantification  and  clarity.  According  to  this,  second 
scenario simulates an institutional change resulting in 
a shift toward a quota system which allows farmers to 
have an idea about fixed quantities that they dispose 
during  the  agricultural  seasons.  Finally  the  third 
scenario adds transferability of the property right to 
the second scenario.  
  B. Area of study and data collection  
The Cap Bon is located in northern Tunisia and is 
bounded in the East by the Mediterranean Sea. In 2004 
around 22% of total populations in the Cap Bon region 
are employed in the agricultural sector. According to 
the CRDA Nabeul (2006) [24], main crops produced 
in  the  region  are  fruits (60,500  ha),  cereals  (53,000 
                                                 
2.  Given  that  GIC’s  performances  are  different,  the  PR 
attributes and the results can be different from a sample 
of users to another according to the GIC performance. 
Thus, our study and results are specific for the region 
and GIC studied.  
ha),  and  vegetables  (35,000  ha).  Total  agricultural 
production of Cap Bon contributes with nearly 15% to 
the total national agricultural production. The number 
of farms in the region is about of 32,000 (6.6% of total 
Tunisian farms). Total agricultural area of the region is 
256,500 ha, of which 183,000 ha are arable land and 
41,000 ha are irrigable lands. 25,500 ha (92% of total 
irrigated  area)  are  equipped  by  a  public  irrigation 
network and the remaining area is irrigated from dams 
and other private sources. Currently, irrigated areas in 
Cap  Bon  are  about  13.3%  of  the  total  Tunisian 
irrigated lands. 71% of these irrigated areas are belong 
to small and average-sized farms.  
The valuation experiments were carried out on 66 
farmers  belonging  to  two  different  water  users 
associations in the Cap Bon region described above. 
Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics of the 
survey data including the demographic and economic 
characteristics  used  as  explanatory  variables  in  the 
extended logit model.  
Table1. Sample descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean  St.Dev. 
- Age in year  49.31  13.05 
- Years of formal schooling  8  5.86 
- Gross Margin/hectares 
(TND
3/ha)  1788.44  1274.12 
- Irrigated Area in hectares  5.42  11.78 
- Water consumption in cubic 
meters  5818.6  4534.05 
- Satisfaction concerning the 
functioning of WUA 
(percentage)  56  - 
  IV. RESULTS  
  A. Willingness to pay 
The  estimation  of  the  dichotomous  question  was 
made  using  Stata  9  software.  Table  2  shows 
coefficients  of  the  estimated  Hanemann  models
4. 
These coefficients allow calculating the mean of the 
                                                 
3.  TND: Tunisian National Dinar (1 euro = 1.75 TND).  
4.  Hanemann models give easy methods to estimate 
willingness to pay from response of the respondent and 
bid price. (see Hanemann, 1994 for more details).   5 
willingness to pay: E (WTP), for each scenario using 
the method of Hanemann (1994).  
Table2. Estimation of the Hanemann model with only the 
bid price as independent variable 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to pay (binary choice) 



































Table 2 shows that the WTP for an improvement of 
the stability of the water provision in the studied area 
is  around  0.0143  TND  (29.7%  and  21%  of  current 
water  prices  respectively  in  Fondok  Jdid  (FJ)  and 
Lebna-Barrage  (LB)),  which  still  a  weak  value 
according  to  what  water  prices  should  be  if 
considering  increasing  rates  planed  by  government 
(15%  of  increase  per  year,  in  nominal  term).  New 
aggregated prices of water become 0.062 TND in FJ 
area and around 0.082 TND in LB irrigated district. 
The obtained value shows that the problem of water 
provision instability apparently does not affect farmers 
deeply in the studied areas. Weak value of WTP can 
also be explained by the descriptive characteristics of 
both studied regions. In fact, most of the farmers of FJ 
district have a well in their farms. The survey shows 
that 98% of farmers in the FJ district have well in their 
exploitation while this rate is only around 6% in LB 
irrigated  area.  Most  of  the  positive  WTP  were 
recorded in LB area where the current price of water 
still higher compared to the first region.  
Clarification and fixation of water quota (quantity) 
at the beginning of the agricultural year looks to be a 
non-acceptable change by farmers. Recorded WTP for 
this  scenario  was  positive  but  only  around  0.0068 
TND. New aggregated prices become 0.054 TND and 
0.074 TND respectively in F-J and L-B areas, which 
corresponds to an increase of respectively 14.1% and 
10%.  
Finally, relevant results concerning a positive and 
significant WTP value of the surveyed farmers were 
assessed after adding a transferability option of their 
property rights to the second scenario (quotas). WTP 
for this scenario was around 0.0372 TND (77.5% of FJ 
current price and 54.7% of current prices charged in 
LB area); aggregated prices resulted in both regions 
become 0.083 TND and 0.105 TND respectively in FJ 
and LB. This last value indicates that an institutional 
change concerning an enhancement of the usage right 
attributes  toward  a  water  market  corresponds  to  an 
increase  in  the  utility  of  consumer.  Positive  gaps 
between the resulting economic value of the WTP for 
transferable  water  property  rights  and  the  price 
currently charged to irrigators can be considered as an 
economic rent which is exhausted.   
  B. Reasons for WTP responses 
In  order  to  find  which  characteristics  affect  the 
farmers’ WTP, an extended logit model regressing a 
set of explanatory variables was estimated. Explicative 
variables chosen were: age of the farmer (in years), 
schooling (number of years), Gross Margin (GM) per 
hectare  (in  TND),  irrigated  area  (in  hectares),  the 
water users association to which the farmer belongs 
(dummy  variable), satisfaction concerning the WUA 
to  which the  farmer  belongs  (dummy  variable),  and 
total consumption of water (cubic meters). 
Table  3  shows  the  effect  of  each  explicative 
variable cited above on the acceptance of the bid price 
in each model. As predicted by theory, the bid price is 
negatively correlated to the WTP value for all models. 
Total aggregated Gross Margin (GM) per ha is also 
positively and highly correlated to the WTP value for 
all  models.  An  important  finding  concerns  the 
negative  and  significant  correlation  between  total 
irrigated area and WTP in stability and clarity models. 
This  suggests  that  when  irrigated  areas  are  larger, 
farmers WTP, for an improvement in the stability of 
water provision and for a clarification of the right at 
the  beginning  of  the  agricultural  season,  decreases. 
This finding indicates that larger farmers seem to have 
no  problem  of  water  provision  and  water  property 
rights  in  general.  This  reinforces  a  result  found  by 
Chraga  and  Chemakh  (2003)  [20]  concerning  the 
special  treatment  of  their  demand  inside  WUAs 
because of their social weight and power. At the other   6 
hand, this variable affects, the WTP for institutional 
change  toward  a  water  market  positively,  but  not 
significant.     
Table3. Econometric results of the estimated logit model 
Dependent variable: Willingness to pay (binary choice) 
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The dummy variable related to the satisfaction of 
farmers, concerning the functioning of WUAs, affects 
their WTP for the first two scenarios significantly and 
positively.  Total  water  consumption  and  number  of 
year schooling are two variables which positively and 
significantly affect WTP in the third model implying 
that  high  water  consumers  and  the  most  educated 
farmers are willing to pay more for transferable water 
property rights.  
  C. Analysis of the probability of acceptance  
In  this  section  we  try  to  analyze  the  effect  of 
changes  in  relevant  variables  from  the  previous 
section,  on  the  probability  of  acceptance  of  higher 
prices  of  irrigation  water  in  the  studied  areas.  Two 
changes (change in gross margin per ha, and change in 
the  satisfaction  concerning  the  functioning  of  the 
WUA)  were  integrated  in  three  sub-scenarios.  The 
initial mean values of the studied sample described in 
table  1  are  taken  as  the  initial  situation  and  then 
equation (5) is calculated for the following changes:  
- Initial situation plus changes in satisfaction 
dummy variable (from 0 to 1) for farmers of FJ 
area. We mention that only 26.4% of FJ farmers 
are  satisfied  about  the  functioning  of  their 
WUA, while this rate is around 84.5% in LB. 
For this reason, the initial situation in FJ area is 
regarded as non satisfaction.    
- Initial situation plus an increase of 10, 20 
and  50%  in  the  gross  margin  per  hectare 
reflecting  an  increase  of  the  farmers’ 
productivity  after  an  agricultural  policy 
intended to improve this index.    
Only the second sub-scenario was applied for the 
third  model  (quotas  +  transferability  of  the  right) 
which  regress  different  variables  than  regressed  in 
models 1 and 2. 
Figure  1  reflects  the  same  trend  mentioned  in 
previous  sections  concerning  the  difference  between 
the  acceptance  levels  of  each  scenario.  However,  it 
also shows that an improvement in the perceptions of 
farmers  concerning  the  organization  and  functioning 
of  their  WUA  in  addition  to  an  improvement  in 
productivity  of  rural  areas  are  important  factor  to 
consider in a pricing policy intended to increase the 
prices  of  irrigation  water  progressively. 
    7 
 
1. Stability scenario 
 
2. Clarity Scenario 
 
3. Clarity + transferability scenario
5 
Fig. 1 Effect of the productivity and the organizational environment on the predicted probability of accepting the bid prices. 
(EI: Initial Situation; GM/Ha: Gross margin per hectare; Sat: satisfaction) 
                                                 
5.  Variables used in the model 3 are different from these used in the two first models. This means that a comparison 
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In fact, for the two first attributes (model 1and 2), it 
is  clear that  there  is  more  chance  that  higher  water 
prices  could  be  accepted  in  LB  area  than  in  FJ. 
Descriptive  analysis  of  the  survey  explains  this 
difference.  About  36.4%  of  farmers  in  LB  are  not 
satisfied with the current state of the WUA’ irrigation 
network  while  this  rate  is  only  around  6%  in  FJ. 
Furthermore, 15% of farmers in LB consider lack of 
water at the moment they need it urgently as a main 
irrigation  constraint.  However,  in  FJ  36%  of  the 
farmers considers quality of water as a main irrigation 
constraint. It is interesting to mention that under the 
improvement  of  property  right  stability  scenario,  a 
change in the satisfaction variable of farmers in the 
region of FJ increases the probability of accepting a 
price increase of 0.02 TND from near 0 to more than 
0.4.  When  adding  an  improvement  of  50%  of  their 
average productivity, this probability even increases to 
about 0.75.          
The  same  effect  of  the  productivity  on  the 
probability  of  acceptance  of  higher  prices  was  also 
drawn for the third scenario, where improvement of 
the farmers’ productivity generates higher probability 
of accepting higher water rates for transferable rights. 
However, it is important to mention that farmers in FJ 
area are willing to pay more for this scenario. This can 
be  related  to  the  availability  of  additional  water 
sources  and  storage  infrastructure  on  their  farms. 
Education level is also higher in FJ farmers surveyed. 
Nearly of 44% of FJ farmers have more than 10 year 
schooling, while 61% of LB farmers have less than 6 
year schooling.  
  V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
This  paper  estimated  that  the  value  of  improving 
irrigation water property rights in Cap Bon region in 
Tunisia is respectively approximately 25, 12, and 65% 
higher than the average water rates in the region for an 
improvement  of  the  stability,  clarity  and 
transferability. The estimation was done using a single 
bounded CVM which has been shown to be reliable 
for assessing the value of PR of irrigation water.  
Results show also that the current system of usage 
PR of irrigation water in Tunisia can be considered as 
inefficient  compared  to  other  systems.  Improved 
systems  containing  more  efficient  attributes  of  PRs 
could help reaching higher rates of cost recovery of 
irrigation water production. It is necessary to analyzes 
opportunity costs of any institutional policy changes 
before taking decisions for shift.  
The  inefficiency  of  the  property  right  transfer 
process  from  collective  to  individual  level,  which 
varies  according  to  the  physical,  technical  and 
financial performances of the WUA, wasn’t large in 
our  case  study.  However,  it  was  clear  that  the 
perfection of this process leads to a higher valuation of 
irrigation  water  from  farmers.  This  result  confirms 
results found by Chebil et al., (2007) [19] in another 
irrigation system in Tunisia.    
Many factors were found to be explicative of the 
farmers’  WTP.  The  bid  price,  the  gross  margin  per 
hectare, total irrigated area, water consumption level 
per  hectare,  and  the  satisfaction  concerning  the 
organization and the functioning of WUA are among 
the most important. This proves the fact that farmers’ 
perceptions of the local governance inside WUA affect 
deeply their willing to pay higher rates of water and to 
accept  changes.  It  will  be  necessary  to  improve  the 
confidence,  transparency  and  accountability  inside 
WUA before proposing pricing policies.  
Pricing policies applied separately from other rural 
and agricultural policies can be unacceptable. Better 
results  of  such  policies  can  be  drawn  when 
accompanied for example with an agricultural policy 
intended to improve the productivity of farmers. The 
effect of the productivity on the WTP was also proved, 
by  Chebil  et  al.,  (2007)  [19],  to  be  significant  in 
explaining  willingness  to  pay  of  the  horticultural 
farmers of Teboulba region in Tunisia.  
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